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The nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians in 1956 was an 
international controversy.  As history, the topic has been just as controversial among 
scholars; however events such as: the planning of the Aswan Dam, the Protocol of 
Sèvres, the Bandung Conference, and the Baghdad Pact have helped crystalize the 
perspective and significance of the Suez Crisis. The United States dealings in Egypt 
during the Suez Crisis, and subsequent relations with Abdel Nasser, cemented United 
States Cold War foreign policy, culminating in the passing of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
While these events were the enactment of containment policy, they also shaped the 
scholarly opinion on the cause, effects, and conclusions of the Suez Crisis. This paper 
utilizes State Department Records, a thorough historiographical survey, additional 
related primary and secondary sources, and international sources such as Nasser, My 
Husband by Tahia Gamal Abdel Nasser or Vernon Bogdanor’s continuing series of 
lectures on the Suez Crisis. From this wide analysis of sources, it is clear that 
the United States dealings in the Middle East created a hierarchy of foreign policy goals 
and values, which explain U.S. policy.  Furthermore, U.S. intervention, and Nasser’s 
ability as a nationalist icon, was the catalyst that pushed Nasser’s Egypt further towards 
the Communist camp.   
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Animosity between the United States of Soviet Russia (U.S.S.R.) and the United 
States of America (U.S.) has been a constant, nagging problem which has plagued the 
world for most of recent history. Those who grew up during the Cold War lived in 
constant fear of global nuclear annihilation. This fear was a byproduct of the 
technological superiority shared by the U.S. and U.S.S.R., the eminent superpowers of 
the twenty first century. Both nations waged war across the globe, using money, 
weapons, and influence to spread their doctrines far beyond their geographic borders. 
In the thousands of years of recorded history prior to this new system of control, global 
politics were conducted largely in a different way. As a precursor to the Cold War, 
Colonialism was the leading method of domination, a direct occupation of a land and its 
people, but also an indirect economic subjugation. This was how the world worked for 
centuries, until the Suez Crisis would help birth a new world order.  
The Suez Crisis marks a major turning point in global history. Capitalism, 
Communism, or Colonialism, the world was at an impasse. The outdated and ineffective 
horns of Colonialism were dying or already dead and the two raging bulls of Capitalism 
and Communism were charging to take its place. The events preceding and directly 




In the late months of 1956, Egypt shocked colonial Britain, and by in large the 
world, when they decisively captured and nationalized the Suez Canal, which 
geographically divided the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Oceans by way of the Red 
Sea. This was achieved under the command of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
Previously, the Suez Canal was occupied by the British and used as a passage to 
transport African and Middle Eastern oil, into Europe and Western Asia. The Egyptian 
nationalization of the Suez Canal started a revolution that would reveal American 
foreign policy in the Middle East for the first time since WWII. In the coming centuries, 
one after another, former colonies began to break from the tight shackles of 
Colonialism, and Imperial powers such as Britain and France were forced to respond to 




Most American scholars agree that the Suez Crisis opened the door to 
Communism in the Middle East. The three stalwarts of this belief are found in the 
sources: Legacy of Ashes1, by Tim Weiner, We Now Know2, by John Lewis Gaddis and 
America, Russia and the Cold War3 by Walter LaFeber. All three of these sources were 
written post-Cold War and provide a meta view of the situation; It is difficult to touch on 
the subjects of the Suez Crisis and the Cold War without giving all three of these 
                                                          
1 Weiner, Tim. Legacy of ashes: the history of the CIA. New York: Anchor Books, 2008. 
2 Gaddis, John Lewis. We now know: rethinking Cold War history. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 




sources consideration. As time progresses, different, more narrow views and 
interpretations of the Suez Crisis have emerged such as, Nasser as a leader, anti-
colonial sentiment, international economics, and Cold War hydraulics. Sources such as: 
The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis4 by Diane Kuntz explain the severe 
economic impact of the crisis. While sources such as Britain, the United States and the 
Rise of an Egyptian Leader5, by Michael Thornhill explain Nasser’s rise to power and 
fame as a potential Nationalistic leader of the Arab world. British scholars have also 
written extensively on their actions in the Suez Canal. In Vernon Bogdanor’s Lecture on 
the Suez Crisis6, he takes a highly critical stance on the actions of British Prime Minister 
Sir Anthony Eden. Another necessary topic of discussion is Arab Nationalism. Sources 
such as Containing Arab Nationalism7 by Salim Yaqub show how the United States 
went to great lengths to contain the threat of a unified Arab Nation. Finally, sources 
such as The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine8 by Ray Takeyh investigate how the 
events of the Suez Crisis and Cold War dealings in Egypt and throughout the Middle 
East had an enormous influence on the conception, proposal, and implementation of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.  Vital primary sources of communications between government 
officials as well as published memoirs and journals are available to the public and 
provide much needed context in the mess that was the Suez Crisis.  
                                                          
4 Kunz, Diane B. The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991.  
5 Michael T. Thornhill. Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader: The Politics and Diplomacy of 
Nasser’s Consolidation of Power, 1952–4. English Historical Review 2004 119: 892-921. 
6 Bogdanor, Vernon. “The Suez Crisis, 1956”. The Museum of London, London. Tuesday, 10th of November 2015. 
Lecture 
7 Yaqub, Salim. Containing Arab Nationalism: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004. 







The U.S.'s decision making during the Suez Crisis simultaneously substantiated 
U.S. Cold War global priorities and served as a catalyst for Colonel Nasser to serve his 
own ends by playing the U.S. against the U.S.S.R in two specific ways: 1) The U.S. 
decision to not actively participate in the Protocol of Sèvres reveals a burgeoning United 
States-Middle East Cold War foreign policy, which revealed U.S. international priorities 
well beyond Egypt.  Analyzing events such as George Kennan's Long Telegram on the 
Soviets in 1947, the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the signing of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 
1957, this paper argues that Communist containment was the top priority of United 
States foreign policy; however, other factors certainly played into U.S. foreign policy 
making as well.  This included U.S. anti-colonial sentiments, loyalty to international 
allies, maintaining international economic interests, and the reconstruction of Europe; 
but, the threat of Communism consistently trumped these other factors. In fact, it was 
this ferocity that drove Nasser closer towards the Communist camp. 2)Nasser was not a 
Communist, rather he was a nationalist; however, when the United States refused to 
support his nationalist agenda, he realized he could get their attention by playing to their 
fear of spreading Soviet Communism in the Middle East. This tactic is best evidenced 
by Nasser’s constantly transforming nationalism, his abuse of politics to obtain 







The idea for the Suez Canal was first conceived and signed into effect on 
November 30th, 1854. The contract was signed by the Viceroy of Egypt, Mohammed 
Said Pasha. The agreement allowed French engineer, Ferdinand de Lessups, to form a 
financing company for the canal and begin construction. On July 5, 1856, the final 
agreement was signed by the Viceroy and the Universal Company of Suez Maritime 
was formed, a multinational conglomerate, the primary shareholder of which were the 
French and the British. The Canal opened for passage in 1869. At the time of the 
signing Egypt was an independent nation ruled by Ishmail the Magnificent. Ishmail is 
credited with bringing Egypt into the modern world but at the sincere price of French 
and British colonial subjugation. 
On July 26th, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sent shockwaves 
throughout the global economy by issuing a new law, placing the Compagnie 
Universelle du Canal de Suez, better known as the Universal Company of the Suez 
Canal, under Egyptian national control. Nasser saw his actions as heroic and patriotic, 
concluding his speech by condemning the first world’s “imperialist efforts [to] thwart 
Egyptian independence”.9 
The takeover was outlined in six (VI) articles. Article I reads “The Universal 
Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Egyptian joint-stock company) is hereby 
nationalized. All its assets, rights and obligations are transferred to the Nation and all 
                                                          
9 Documents on American Foreign Relations. 1956. Dir. of publ. Zinner, Paul E. 1957. New York: published for the 
Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers. "Decree of the President of the Republic of Egypt on the 




the organizations and committees that now operate its management are hereby 
dissolved”.10 A clear and decisive act to say the least. Article I goes on to say that all 
international shareholders will have their stocks reimbursed at their market value on the 
day before the takeover.  
 Article II of Nasser’s new law addresses one of the most highly disputed topics of 
the canal nationalization. The article states that all employees of the newly founded 
Suez Canal Transit Service will be picked by Nasser himself, but more importantly free 
passage through the canal will continue unimpeded. In 1888 the Constantinople 
convention concluded that the canal and its ports “shall be open forever, as neutral 
passages, to every merchant vessel crossing from one sea to the other”.11 Ironically, at 
the time of the convention Egypt was still a part of the Ottoman Empire and was not 
formally included in the agreement.  
 Article III of the new law freezes all assets in the Canal company. This means 
that investors both foreign and local were unable to access their shareholdings. This 
article is an attempt to avoid the financial collapse that would follow if all of the 
shareholders in the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal dumped their 
stocks.  
 Article IV of Nasser’s address is a controversial topic indeed. The article states 
that all acting employees who were previously working for the Universal Suez 
                                                          
10 Speech by Gamal Abdel Nasser on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company (26 July 1956) 
11 Constantinople Convention, 1888 Convention between Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Russia and turkey, respecting the free navigation of the Suez maritime canal signed at 




Company, no matter their nationality, were obligated by law to remain at their posts. 
This would mean that a U.S. citizen working on the canal could, by Egyptian law, be 
jailed and held against their will for not working. The number of U.S. citizens working in 
Suez at the time was low, estimated to be “more than one”.12 If an American was held 
against their will in a foreign country while working for a previously international 
company, it would be immediate grounds for U.S. intervention.  
 Article V solidifies just how serious Egypt was about the nationalization of the 
Suez Canal. In an almost threatening way the article reads “All violations of the 
provisions of Article III shall be punished by imprisonment and a fine equal to three 
times the value of the amount involved in the offense. All violations of the provisions of 
Article IV shall be punished by imprisonment in addition to the forfeiture by the offender 
of all rights to compensation, pension or indemnity”.13 The final article, article VI 
reaffirms that this document is effectively a new Egyptian law. 
 
The Long Telegram 
 
 The combat of WWII brought about international alliances formed solely for the 
ensured survival of the modern world. One of these necessary alliances was between 
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. As WWII ended with the surrender of the Japanese threat, a 
new reality emerged. These two former wartime allies, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., were 
fundamentally different in their nature of both foreign policy and internal affairs. In 
                                                          
12 United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor 
Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956  
Volume XVI  
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955-1957 
13 Speech by Gamal Abdel Nasser on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company (26 July 1956) 
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February 1946, the U.S. Department of State sent a letter to the embassy in Moscow 
asking for: 1) basic features of post-war Soviet outlook 2) background of this outlook 3) 
its projection in practical policy on an official level 4) its projection on an unofficial level 
and 5) practical deductions from standpoint of U.S. policy. What they received was an 
eight-thousand-word telegram from George Kennan, an American official living in 
Moscow. United States officials got exactly what they were looking for. Kennan wrote a 
damning telegram later rewritten as a book entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”.14  
In this telegram he described a very real Communist threat, leading to a 
conclusion which outlined his thoughts on what can be done about this threat. Kennan 
stated that Soviet international policy aimed “to increasing in every way strength and 
prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of 
armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about 
internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in the dark… 
Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official 
limits of Soviet power.”15 Despite this, Kennan believed that the Soviet threat could be 
stopped without another world war. This hypothesis laid the grounds for the start of the 
Cold War. The conclusion to his paper makes assertions about the potential outcome of 
a conflict between the U.S.S.R. and U.S. Kennan believed that the United States was 
inherently stronger than their Soviet counterparts, and that using containment and 
dedication to capitalism the United States could be victorious. 
                                                          
14 George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs (July 1947) 
15 George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs (July 1947) 
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 What was not up for debate was the fact that conflict was inevitable. Kennan’s 
paper concluded with a marshal plan, stating “if the US had the ‘courage and self-
confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society’, and if ‘our 
public is educated to realities of Russian situation’, the menace of Soviet Communism 
could be resisted.”16 This telegram birthed the foundation for U.S. foreign policy 
throughout the Cold War, placing the emphasis on U.S.S.R. Communism containment, 
and a renewed belief in the American Capitalist system. The information that Kennan 
provided on the Soviets was invaluable, it was the first time the United States received 
an in depth look at the workings of the Soviet Communist State. U.S. policy makers, 
including President Eisenhower, would heed the words of Kennan very closely in their 
decisions on containing the Communist threat in the Middle East, and the U.S.’s role in 
the Suez Crisis.  
 
The Protocol of Sèvres 
 
In October of 1956, a secret meeting, known as the Protocol of Sèvres, was held 
between Israel, France, and the United Kingdom. The three governments agreed to a 
land invasion against Colonel Nasser’s Egypt. Israel would launch the first attack and 
take control of the canal, following this, Britain and France would demand the Egyptian 
and Israeli militaries cease fighting and withdraw from the canal, which would be 
                                                          
16 The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State 
SECRET. Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 pm [Received February 22-3: 52 pm] 




summarily reoccupied by the British. The Israeli troops would withdraw from the canal 
and allow the Europeans to recapture it without resistance.   
The initial British reaction to the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal was 
one of panic and urgency. Sir Anthony Eden, the acting British Prime Minister reached 
out to the U.S. for assistance. In the previous fifty years, the United States had emerged 
as new global superpower. They had played pivotal roles in both World War I and World 
War II and had emerged as an industry leader in the 1940’s. The U.S. refused to 
support Britain’s plan, a crippling blow to the perceived continued alliance between the 
two western powers, and a bold statement as to the United States opinion on the 
methods of Colonialism. In a telegram sent on July 27th, the day directly proceeding the 
nationalization of a canal, a telegram was received from the U.S. Embassy in London. 
The telegram expressed the British Government’s attitude and discussed actions 
pertaining to the Canal. If anything was to be done about the Egyptian Nationalization of 
the Canal, it had to be done legally and on a worldwide scale17. The British could not 
simply justify an invasion under the guise of retaking stolen property. One of the main 
issues plaguing the British cabinet was whether Nasser’s nationalization of the Canal 
had violated the Free Passage Act of the 188818, allowing the passage of all merchant 
and military vessels through the canal in times of peace or war. It also seemed that the 
U.S.’s decision to act or not, would not stop British officials from continuing their plans, 
fearing if Britain was to wait for U.S. recourse the matter would become too bogged 
                                                          
17 Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/7-2756. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 3:38 a.m. Repeated to Lima, 
Cairo, and Paris 
18 Constantinople Convention, 1888 Convention between Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Russia and turkey, respecting the free navigation of the Suez maritime canal signed at 




down. British cabinet urged U.S. officials stating “Western governments must consider 
possible economic, political, and military measure against Egypt to ensure canal 
maintenance, freedom of transit through it. And reasonable tolls”19.  Britain and France 
were resolute in their intentions to retake the canal, to not act would be to show 
weakness. The U.S. feared something much greater than the fall of Colonialism, they 
feared the potential rise of the Communist party in Egypt and the Middle East.  
The U.S. decision to not participate in the Protocol of Sèvres is a shining 
example of the hierarchy of importance which formed U.S. international policy. The 
United States desire to contain Communism overrode every other point on the list, 
where Communism was concerned, everything else went on the backburner. The 
United States feared that by taking a stance and supporting their allies, they would be 
taking a stance against Egyptian Nationalism. To stand against Egyptian Nationalism 
would be to drive Nasser straight into the hands of the U.S.S.R., opening the door to 
Communism in the Middle East. The events of the Suez Crisis, as well as George 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” would have a severe and undeniable impact on President 




                                                          
19 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955–1957, SUEZ CRISIS, JULY 26–DECEMBER 31, 1956, VOLUME 




The Eisenhower Doctrine 
 
On the front line of the Allied invasion into Europe was General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s position and actions in World War II would be in direct 
contrast to how he ran his presidential cabinet. When fighting on the front lines, 
subversion and planning is outweighed by the ferocity of the fighting force. The 
destruction and loss of life in World War II had a major impact on Eisenhower as a 
president. Eisenhower recognized that the United States, let alone the world, could 
handle another war on the same scale. This fact played a major role in the president’s 
decision and policy making. Eisenhower much preferred to use covert tactics, 
employing the “invisible hand”20 to spread U.S. doctrine and financials throughout the 
world.  
While Eisenhower was a strict anti-interventionist, the cabinet with which he 
surrounded himself agreed that urgent action must be taken if the Western World’s 
position in the Middle East was not to be challenged. At the top of the list of these fears 
was the threat of Soviet Communism, but other factors influenced the decision to not 
intervene such as the fact that the Western World’s supply of oil would be majorly 
affected if passage from the canal was halted. The immediate impact of the Suez 
Nationalization was somewhat negligible for the U.S., most investment in the canal was 
from French and English sources, with only a few privately-owned U.S. shares. 
Eisenhower believed that if the U.S. was to intervene it simply could not be on a tri-party 
                                                          




basis between the U.S., Britain, and France. If action was to be taken, it must be taken 
on a worldwide scale, involving all the maritime powers.21 A temporary solution, 
Eisenhower believed, would be for Britain and France to release an international 
statement denouncing Egyptian rule of the canal leaving the decision up to an 
international court. If Egypt was to respond with military action to this refusal to observe 
new ownership, it would give Western powers a clear reason for military intervention.  
Throughout Eisenhower’s presidential term he remained a strict 
noninterventionist. He preferred using covert tactics and CIA intervention in international 
quarrels rather than using direct force.22 This trend continued throughout his entire 
presidency, and this was no coincidence. The happenings and results of the crisis at the 
Suez Canal had a massive impact on the foreign policy of President Eisenhower.  
Eisenhower released the “Eisenhower Doctrine” on January 5th, 1957.23 The 
doctrine allowed the U.S. to intervene, if requested, in the Middle East with either 
economic or military assistance and was deeply rooted in his beliefs of “any nation’s 
right to form a government and an economic system of its own choosing is 
inalienable…any nation’s attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is 
indefensible”.24 The doctrine specifically singled out the threat of a global Communism 
ensuring the U.S. “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression 
                                                          
21 Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, July 27th, 1956, 8:30AM. 
Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret  Drafted by Goodpaster 
22 Greenstein, Fred I. The hidden-hand presidency: Eisenhower as leader. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994. 
23 Eisenhower, Dwight. “President Eisenhower's Speech on the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine), 
1957.” Council on Foreign Relations. Eisenhower Doctrine, 5 Jan. 1957. 
24 Legacy of ashes page 97 
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from any nation controlled by international Communism.”25 The events of the Suez 
Crisis taking place a year earlier, had a direct and undeniable impact on Eisenhower’s 
decision to release his doctrine. The doctrine intended to curb the perceived Communist 
growth in the Middle East, and was a direct response to that perceived threat. The 
Eisenhower Doctrine would dictate United States foreign policy all throughout the Cold 
War and provided a clear definition of U.S. sentiment and their supreme fear of 
Communism taking over the Middle East. This anti-communist imperative is evident 
from the original sending of the Long Telegraph, to the U.S. refusal to intervene in the 
Suez Canal, concluding with a physical document, damning the progression of global 
Communism in the form of the Eisenhower Doctrine. This new agenda was inspired by 
the events of the Suez Crisis and Nasser’s Egypt, and put into words in the form of the 
The Eisenhower Doctrine. To understand the Eisenhower Doctrine, and United States 
foreign policy in the Middle East, it is crucial to also understand the relationship between 
Nasser, Eisenhower, and other top U.S. diplomats. While the United States was 
creating their new agenda, President Nasser was creating an agenda of his own.  
Middle Eastern Political Climate 
 
Since the conception and conclusion of the American Revolution in 1783, U.S. 
politics have been staunchly anti-colonial. In the grander scheme, most U.S. politicians 
believed in the right to a human being’s self-determination, they had just fought and won 
a war over that very right. The conclusion of WWII in 1945 created an international 
power vacuum that needed to be filled. In the west stood Capitalism, in the east 
                                                          
25 Eisenhower, Dwight. “President Eisenhower's Speech on the U.S. Role in the Middle East (Eisenhower Doctrine), 
1957.” Council on Foreign Relations. Eisenhower Doctrine, 5 Jan. 1957. 
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Communism, and in between those two a series of competing Colonial and ex-Colonial 
nations. What would ensue was a half a decade “Cold War” that would dictate global 
foreign policy and international relations into the 21st century.  
Where anticommunist and pro-colonial agendas could be met simultaneously, 
The United States could support their Colonial allies. To do so in Egypt would be to go 
against everything that Nasser and his new Nationalist Egypt stood for. By supporting 
Colonial interests, they were actively increasing the threat of driving Nasser away from 
Capitalism and towards Communism. What developed under Nasser’s rule was an 
Egypt that had been flung into the modern world. Prior to the Suez Crisis, the Middle 
East had always been a hotspot for conflict and violence. It makes sense then when the 
Truman administration responded positively when British constructed a “Middle East 
Command”26 (MEC) to be based at the Suez Canal, with the intent of deterring and 
repressing any future Soviet attacks. While this decision aided in the fight against 
Communism it strengthened nearly seventy-year-old British Colonial subjugation which 
had strangled Egypt and left them deeply imbittered. The firm stance seemed 
necessary, the Western World relied on the passage of oil through the Middle East to 
repair the devastating damage from World War Two. The ensured British control of the 
Canal and surrounding airbases put American B-52 bombers within range of some 94 
percent of the Soviet Union’s oil refineries.27 This put the United States into an awkward 
situation of balancing its anti-colonialism versus its existing allegiances. Leaning too far 
                                                          
26 Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, pp. 109-116 
27 Goncharov et al. Uncertain Partners, p. 107 
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in one direction could upset this balance, opening the door to Communist influence in 
the Middle East and Egypt.  
 The U.S. saw Middle Eastern leadership as weak willed and manipulatable, 
making it a prime target for Communist influence. As history shows, doing something 
the same way twice, doesn’t always produce identical results. This was the case in the 
U.S.’s dealings in Egypt. The United States struggled greatly to obtain a political 
foothold in Egypt. Unlike in Mosaddegh’s Iran, which was ripe for revolution but lacking 
a cause, Nasser’s Egypt was able to unify around anti-colonial sentiments and Egyptian 
Nationalism. This unity meant that causing confusion and chaos among the Egyptian 
population would be incredibly tricky. To support the anti-colonial movement would be to 
directly oppose British authority, but to oppose Nasser would push him towards the 
Communist camp. This made the Suez Crisis and Egypt unique in its issues. Subterfuge 
and propaganda would not work, but the American government needed to act, to do 
nothing would be to show weakness. 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles (Dulles), recommended that the American 
Government make a statement along the lines of “The reckless attempt to confiscate a 
great international investment already in Egypt confirms that conditions are not 
propitious for embarking large amounts of foreign capital on another great development 
such as the Aswan Dam”28. Using the Suez Crisis as the U.S.’s reason for their refusal 
to fund the Aswan Dam surely embittered the Egyptian population.  
 
                                                          
28 Gaddis, John Lewis We Now Know pp. 175-176 
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Nasser’s Nationalist Egypt 
 
Third World countries had long since been the plaything of Imperial powers, but 
Egypt would prove to be the exception to this rule. Nasser as a leader, Arab 
Nationalism, and the fear of Communism put Nasser’s Egypt in a unique situation to 
extort the leaders of the modern world by playing on U.S. fears of Cold War Hydraulics 
in the form of Communism entering the Middle East. The Arab world had been 
fragmented for so long. Could Egypt unify the Middle East, if so they would become the 
center of a powerful Arab Empire? The success of these goals relied upon Abdel 
Nasser’s abilities as a leader. He read both the U.S.S.R.’s and U.S.’s post WWII 
international policy like a book. Nasser realized he could pit the two superpowers 
against each other, all while sitting in the middle reaping the rewards of the ensuing 
fallout.  
A dedication to the goal of Arab Nationalism is what drove the steam engine that 
was Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser’s upbringing inspired a deep sense of Egyptian pride 
in himself, a pride which would drive him throughout his entire political career. U.S. 
leaders believed that if Egypt was to so radically nationalize, it could open the possibility 
of Egypt becoming the head of a unified Middle East. This inability to unify the Middle 
East made it an accessible and manipulatable stage for international conflict. The 
citizens of Egypt had watched for the past seventy years as its national products and 
resources had been extracted and exported by foreign powers. The idea of a Pan Arab 
unity in the Middle East seemed farfetched to say the least. There had been brief 
moments of partial unity such as the Umayyad Empire, Ottoman Empire, or 
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Muhammad’s Islamic Empire but a real unity had never been reached.29 While the 
Middle Eastern climate bred chaos, it also had the potential to be bred into a 
Communist or Capitalist society. The current leader and Nationalist icon Gamal Abdel 
Nasser could make that choice for Egypt.  
 
Gamal Abdel Nasser 
 
Gamal Abdel Nasser rose from the woodworks to become one of Egypt’s most 
iconic leaders. The young, bright eyed, and sparkling toothed Egyptian found his 
political start in the city of Alexandria. As a young man he witnessed a clash between 
protesters and police which he joined. It wasn’t until after the protest that Nasser 
learned the group that he had joined was a Pro Egyptian Nationalist group whose sole 
aim was to eradicate Colonial control from Egypt and eventually all the Arab world. After 
finishing school Nasser dove headfirst into a military career. His first combat was in the 
Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Throughout this career Nasser was hypnotized by the notions 
of Egyptian Nationalism and Anti-Colonialism. Using military and political tact, Nasser 
found himself at the head of a massive Egyptian Revolution under which the previous 
leader “King Farouk” was ousted and a perceived power vacuum ensued. This power 
vacuum was almost entirely dominated by Nasser as he proceeded to eliminate his 
political rivals one by one. By January of 1955 Nasser had solidified his position as the 
head of the RCC, (Revolutionary Command Council) and as the leader of Egypt 
pending a national election.  
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U.S. officials were acutely aware of the issue of Colonialism in the Middle East, 
but the various tribes and states of the Middle and Near East had been subjugated, and 
subjugated themselves for thousands of years30. The British were just the current in a 
very long line. A true Arab unity had never been reached, and the various states and 
empires that had arisen throughout history fostered local loyalties, not national ones. 
The world was waking up to the ideas of human rights, national determination, religious 
determination, and basic human freedom. While ideals such as this might have been 
conceived in the “first world”, they were pervasive and all inclusive. These ideals would 
be spread over the entire earth, being used as a not so convincing mask for 
international exploitation; with these ideas came hordes of CIA agents, assassinations, 
espionage, military coupes, drug money, weapons, and military training. No matter the 
amount of subversion that came along with these messages, the message seemed to 
stick. The Middle East was ripe for change, but would this change come from within? It 
would take leaders, strong men who would take strong action, if the Middle East was to 
stand any chance against the dominant imperial powers surrounding them.  
in World War II, a charismatic, determined leader, led his own nation and the rest 
of the world into a chaotic rabbit hole. The wounds from this war were still fresh, Europe 
was still rebuilding. Adolf Hitler was only one man, but his words and ideologies inspired 
a country to undertake a world war. If this had happened once it could happen again. If 
the Arab world was to unify as a single nation their vast reserves of oil and strategic 
location would make them a formidable enemy. This fear might have been a reality, but 
if so it was an incredibly slow moving one. Nasser fought tooth and nail to achieve some 
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sort of Egyptian Nationalism, albeit a Pan-Arab Nationalism was far from being 
conceived. Even if this was the case Nasser saw this Pan-Arab unity as vitally important 
to eradicating Colonialism in the Middle East and Africa. The idea of eradication of 
Colonialism drove Nasser, it was what he based his entire social and political movement 
on. In this respect the U.S. and Egypt were the same. Both nations saw Colonialism as 
an outdated evil that needed to be halted. Alongside this, was the fact that Nasser was 
no Communist. He did not dream of a social revolution sweeping the world, he simply 
dreamt of an Egypt free from Colonial rule.  
Unlike the U.S., Nasser was free from the constraints of the Cold War. At this 
period almost every action that America took both domestically and internationally had 
larger Cold War implications. Nasser’s political movement was fast paced and without 
regard for the larger Cold War ramifications. He would act in the interest of Egypt, not of 
that on a Global Cold War scale, and this scared U.S. politicians. Nasser’s refusal to 
cooperate with the U.S. greatly frustrated Secretary of State Dulles. His response was 
one of attempted Egyptian isolation. In 1955 under heavy United States planning the 
Baghdad Pact was put into action. The pact, modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), effectively walled off Egypt from Europe and the Western World. 
The Baghdad Pact isolated Egypt and Nasser, pushing him father away from the 
western powers into non-alignment. This non-alignment was further solidified by 
Nasser’s attendance at the Bandung Conference.31 It was at this conference that 
Nasser began seriously considering the idea of an arms deal with the U.S.S.R. Nasser 
would have much preferred U.S. weapons over U.S.S.R. weapons, but the U.S. refused 
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to match the U.S.S.R.’s offer. It was after this refusal that Nasser openly acknowledged 
his ties to the U.S.S.R., and began using these ties to manipulate his relations with the 
U.S.  
It was not just the U.S. that Nasser did not trust, he was extremely wary of 
U.S.S.R. intentions in the Middle East, but the U.S.S.R. were relatively short sited in 
their ability to gain a physical or ideological foothold in Egypt. Ignorance played a part, 
The U.S.S.R. was not a Colonial power and it had no experience dealing in the Middle 
East. Orders from Moscow were meant to be strictly followed by local Communist 
groups emplaced in the Middle East. In many cases these orders were not in line with 
those of the local political groups. To compound this authorities in Egypt regularly 
detained and imprisoned local communists.32 The U.S.S.R. proved again shortsighted 
by supporting the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine. By opposing it they could 
have stood to gain powerful allies in the Middle East. It seems that the U.S.S.R. 
wholeheartedly underestimated Egyptian capabilities, in 1948 they negotiated a deal to 
barter Egyptian cotton for Soviet grain, but then irritated Cairo by selling the grain on the 
world market at prices below what the Egyptians were charging.33  
In the words of Secretary of State Dulles, Arab Nationalism was “like an 
overflowing stream…You cannot stand in front of it or oppose it frontally, but you must 
try to keep it inbounds…Although Nasser is not as dangerous as Hitler was, he relies on 
the same hero myth, and we must try to deflate that myth.34” From this comment it 
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seems that U.S. politicians, especially secretary Dulles, were afraid of what Nasser 




The Suez Crisis marked the first public exposure of American foreign policy in 
the Middle East since the conclusion of World War II. This policy, which took 
precedence over all else, was the absolute containment of the Communist threat across 
the entire globe. By directly participating in the Protocol of Sèvres, The United States 
would have taken a firm stance against Egyptian Nationalism. Opposing Egyptian 
Nationalism would be to push Nasser directly into the arms of the Communists, opening 
the door to Communism in Egypt. By refusing to strongly react to the Suez Crisis, the 
United States gave themselves a cushion of time in which to evaluate and assess the 
reality of the threat of Communism in the Middle East. Pressures such as allegiances to 
allies, the rebuilding of Europe, and the free passage of oil from the Suez Canal, were 
all pushed aside by the threat of a Communist takeover in Egypt. Events such as: the 
Long Telegram, the proposed funding of the Aswan Dam, the Baghdad Pact, the Suez 
Crisis, the Protocol of Sèvres, and the drafting of the Eisenhower doctrine, show how 
the United States used restraint and diplomacy in Egypt, rather than military action and 
direct intervention. 
 The Suez Crisis is unique in its issues. In the Vietnam war the United States 
chose direct military intervention. In north Vietnam, Communism was established, there 
was no question as to whether Communism was a local threat or not. Based on this 
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observation the United States intervened on a large scale. In Egypt, during the Suez 
Crisis, the threat of Communism hadn’t fully been established; The United States 
understood that reacting in any bipolar manner would open Egypt to the threat of 
Communism. After all Nasser was not a Communist he was a Nationalist. Nationalism 
dominated his political career and the takeover of the Suez Canal; although, Nasser 
was not afraid to open his country to Communism if it meant further obtaining his 
Nationalistic goals. This was solidified when Nasser attended the Bandung conference 
and met many other like-minded leaders who had been swayed by the allure of 
Communism. it was Nasser’s abilities as a Third World leader, playing the U.S.S.R. 
against the U.S., which branded him as one of the most influential Middle Eastern 
leaders to date. The U.S.'s decision making during the Suez Crisis simultaneously 
substantiated U.S. Cold War global priorities and served as a catalyst for Colonel 
Nasser to serve his own ends by playing the U.S. against the U.S.S.R in two specific 
ways: 1) The U.S. decision to not actively participate in the Protocol of Sèvres reveals a 
burgeoning United States-Middle East Cold War foreign policy, which revealed U.S. 
international priorities well beyond Egypt; 2)Nasser was not a Communist, rather he 
was a Nationalist; however, when the United States refused to support his nationalist 
agenda, he realized he could get their attention by playing to their fear of spreading 
U.S.S.R. Communism in the Middle East. 
The ramifications of the Suez Crisis followed mankind into the 21st century. 
Nasser and his ambitious nationalization of Egypt marked a milestone in the long story 
of Arab Nationalism. This idea has been carried into the modern day Middle East, where 
conflict continues to rage over the ideas of Islamic Imperialism, and an independent 
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Arab Empire. President Nasser helped solidify the idea that a charismatic and intelligent 
leader, especially one located in the Middle East, could use their position to extort the 
leading nations of the modern world.  Although the threat of a Communist Soviet Empire 
is not present in the modern day, the echoes of the decisions made during the Cold War 
are still sounding. Conflicts in Egypt, Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba have shaped the 
modern understanding of Communism, Capitalism, and U.S. foreign policy. Analyzing 
history such as the Eisenhower Doctrine or the events of the Suez Crisis and its 
ensuing fallout can help humanity predict and interpret the chaos of the modern day 
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